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SPECIAL REPORTS 
provide something more than a rough estimate, although 
absolute precision is not necessary.24 
It was conceded that the amount of the liability had 
been shown in Hughes Properties; the payoff indicator 
amounts were stipulated.25 The Commissioner argued, 
however, that the fact of liability would not be fixed for 
any particular slot machine until a winner pulled the 
machine handle.26 Only then would all contingencies, 
including the identity of the winner and the time of 
payment, have disappeared. 
Both the Claims Court27 and the Federal Circuit28 held 
for Hughes, viewing the liability as fixed by Nevada law at 
midnight on the last day of the fiscal year. The all events 
test was met on the final play of the machine before 
year's end, "that is, the last change in the jackpot amount 
before the amount is recorded for accounting purposes."29 
In Nightingale v. United States,30 however, the Ninth 
Circuit had come to a different conclusion on similar 
facts involving another Nevada casino: 
The one, indispensable ... event is the winning of 
the progressive jackpot by some fortunate gam-
bler .... Gambling being what it is, and gambling 
odds being what they are, it is entirely possible that 
no actual liability will ever occur .... [T]here is no 
way of knowing when any particular progressive 
"one armed bandit" will pay off, nor what the 
amount of that payoff will then be.31 
. 
Hughes. Properties and Nightingale, neither of which 
implicated new section 461 (h) of the Code, thus produced 
the conflict for Supreme Court review. 
C. Supreme Court Decision 
The Court ruled for Hughes: the obligation imposed by 
the Nevada statute and regulations fixed a liability in fact 
at the end of the casino's taxable year. The casino had 
therefore properly deducted each year's increase .in the 
payoff indicator total. In arriving at that conclusion, the 
Court resolved a number of issues that had puzzled lower 
courts and commentators in cases like Hughes Properties 
prior to the 1984 Act: 
1. Statutory Liabilities. An obligation under state law 
can fix a liability prior to the performance that satisfies 
the liability: "[A]s a matter of state law, [Hughes] had a 
fixed liability for the jackpot which it could not escape."32 
This issue had been important, for example, in cases 
involving statutorily mandated reclamation obligations 
associated with strip mining.33 The Internal Revenue 
Service's position, rejected by the Court, had consistently 
been that a statute is irrelevant in determining the fact of 
a liability. A statute, the government argued, does not fix 
24See Jensen, supra note 11, at 462-67. 
zs54 U.S.L.W. at 4574. 
26ld.; Brief for the United States at 13, Hughes Properties. 
275 Cis. Ct. 641, 645, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragraph 
9616, at 84,778 (1984). 
26760 F.2d 1292, 1293, 85-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragraph 
9359, at 87,943 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
295 Cis. Ct. at 645, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH}, at 84,778. 
30684 F.2d 611, 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragraph 9533 (9th 
Cir. 1982). 
31 684 F.2d at 614, 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH), at 84,907. 
3254 U.S.L.W. at 4575. 
33E.g., Ohio River Collieries Co. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1369 
(1981) (holding that state statute fixed, in year land was dis-
turbed, strip miner's obligation to reclaim mined land). 
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an obliga.tion by itself, and it does not even strengthen 
the case for deducting a liability arising under a bilateral 
contract.34 In either case, a liability remains contingent, in 
the government's view, until performance.35 
2. Unknown Payee. A liabili!Y can befixed even though 
the identity of the ultimate payee is not known: "The 
obligation is there, and whether it turns out that the 
winner is one patron or another makes no conceivable 
difference as to basic liability."36 Prior to Hughes Proper-
ties, the Service, in a number of cases involving worker's 
compensation and similar obligations, had argued that 
such a liability is necessarily contingent.37 In the govern-
ment's view, a liability cannot be fixed until some person 
exists who can assert a claim against the taxpayer.38 
3. Uncertain Time for Payment. A liability can be fixed 
even though the time of the future payment is unknown. 
As the Court stated, "[O]nly the exact time of payment 
and the identity of the winner remained for the future."39 
The Court noted, almost as an aside, that the govern-
ment's brief "speaks of the time value of money,"40 but it 
rejected that as a serious issue.41 
34The Service's view has also consistently been that a bilateral 
contract standing alone does not fix a liability prior to perform-
ance because no obligation to make payment solidifies until that 
time. See L TR 7831003 (Apr. 13, 1978) (technical advice memo-
randum considering timing of deduction for strip miner's statu-
tory reclamation obligation); Jensen, supra note 11, at 457-58 
(describing LTR 7831003). 
35See L TR 7831003 (Apr. 13, 1978}; Jensen, supra note 11, at 
457-60. 
3654 U.S.LW. at 4575. 
37The Service had generally been unsuccessful in its argument. 
See, e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1304, 83-2 
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragraph 9621 (9th Cir. 1983) (permitting 
current deduction to cover uncontested liabilities, under worker's 
compensation laws, arising from injuries to employees); Wash-
ington Post Co. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1279, 69-1 U.S. Tax 
Cas. (CCH} paragraph 9192 {Ct. Cl. 1969} (permitting current 
deduction of accrued, but unpaid, contributions to n.ewspaper 
dealer profit-sharing plan}; Ohio River Collieries Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 77 T.C. 1369 (1981) (permitting current deduction for 
future strip mining reclamation obligation even though identity 
of party to perform reclamation was unknown); Reynolds Metals 
Co. v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 943 (1977) {permitting current de-
duction for future payments to trusts under supplemental un-
employment benefit (SUB) plans); Lukens Steel Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 52 T.C. 764 (1969), aff'd, 442 F.2d 1131,71-1 U.S. Tax 
Cas. (CCH) paragraph 9374 (3d Cir. 1971} (to same effect as 
Reynolds Metals). 
38See Brief for the United States at 13, Hughes Properties. In 
its reply brief, the government hinted that its position in some of 
the-earlier cases involving "group liabilities," cited in supra note 
37, may have changed. However, even if those cases were rightly 
decided, the government argued, they were distinguishable from 
Hughes Properties. In Lukens Steel, for example, the taxpayer 
had an obligation to make payments, on behalf of its employees, 
to a supplemental unemployment benefit plan trust. The govern-
ment had at the time argued that such a liability was contingent 
because, among other reasons, the identities of the· ultimate 
payees were unknown. 52 T.C. at 786-87. While the government 
now suggests that the obligation to the entity, the trust, may 
itself have constituted a fixed liability, no such entity or other 
group obligee existed in Hughes Properties: "The obligee may 
be an individual or an entity; the obligee may be identifiable or 
unknown; but there must be an obligee." Reply Brief for the 
United States at 8-10, Hughes Properties. 
3954 U.S.L.W. at 4575 (emphasis added). 
40/d. 
41 See infra notes 51-65 and accompanying text (discussing 
time value of money and how 1984 Act deals with that issue). 
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The Court's opinion does not make clear whether time 
value issues were unimportant primarily because of the 
particular facts of Hughes Properties. Where jackpots are 
paid on the average every 4% months, the benefits of ac-
celerated deductions would generally be. small.42 How-
ever, the opinion can also be read to suggest that the time 
value of money is always an irrelevant consideration 
under the all events test. This latter reading is consistent 
with the implication of prior cases: that the time value of 
money, if it is an issue at all under pre-Act law, is properly 
taken into account under other doctrines such as "clear 
reflection of income."43 ln any event, while the boundaries 
of the opinion in Hughes Properties may be fuzzy on this 
point, the Court clearly rejected the Service's long-time 
contention that a liability is necessarily contingent under 
the all events test if the precise time of payment is 
unknown.44 
4. Possibility That Payment Will Not be Made. The fact 
that a taxpayer may go out of business prior to satisfaction 
of a liability does not necessarily make the liability 
contingent.45 Thus, although Hughes could have avoided 
421n the opinion, the recital of the machine payoff records, see 
supra text accompanying notes 16-19, was not directly tied to 
the limited discussion of the time value of money issues. Instead, 
the Court merely noted that, "since the casino of course must 
pay taxes on the income it earns from the use of as-yet-unwon 
jackpots, the Government vastly overestimates the time value of 
{Hughes's] deductions." 54 U.S.L.W. at 4576. 
431.R.C. section 446(b) provides that "if the method [of ac-
counti_ng] used does not clearly reflect income, the computation 
of taxable income shall be made under such method as, in the 
opinion of the Secretary, does clearly reflect income." The best..: 
known instance in which the Service successfully attacked a 
premature accrual on the basis of the "clear reflection" standard 
is Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 400, 69-2 U.S. 
Tax Cas. (CCH) paragraph 9714 (5th Cir. 1969). In Mooney 
Aircraft, the taxpayer had sought to deduct a liability that might 
not be satisfied fo.r as long as 30 years. Although the technical 
requirements of the all events test had been met in the case, the 
court concluded that the possible time between accrual and 
satisfaction was "too long," and that a current deduction there-
fore would "not clearly reflectincome." 420 F.2d at 409-10, 69-2 
U.S. Tax Cas. {CCH), at 85,982. See Aidinoff & Lopata, Section 
461 and Accrual-Method Taxpayers: The Treatment of Liabilities 
Arising from Obligations to be Performed in the Future, 33 Tax 
Law. 789,800-06 (1980); Jensen, supra note 11, at 469-72. 
The trial judge and the Supreme Court in Hughes Properties 
both suggested that the government has the power under I.R.C. 
section 446(b) to correct abusive situations that nevertheless 
meet the requirements of the all events test. The clear reflection 
doctrine might apply, for example, {i) if a casino were to place 
additional machines with very high jackpots on the floor near the 
end of a taxable year solely in order to boost its deduction for 
the year; (ii) if a casino were to set extremely high odds on some 
machines to lessen the probability of payout in the near future; 
or (iii) if a casino were to transfer guaranteed amounts from 
machines with favorable payout probabilities to machines with 
relatively unfavorable probabilities in order to defer indefinately 
the payout obligation. 5 Cis. Ct. at 646, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 
(CCH), at 84,779; 54 U.S.L.W. at 4575-76. 
44See, e.g., Denise Coal v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 930, 935, 
59-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragraph 9769, at 74,035 (3d Cir. 
1959) (permitting current deduction for future strip mining 
reclamation obligation); Lukens Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 52 
T.C. 764, 784-85 (1969), aff'd, 442 F.2d 1131, 71-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 
(CCH) section 9374 (3d Cir. 1971) {permitting current deduction 
for future payments to trust under supplemental unemployment 
benefit plans). 
4554 U.S.L.W. at 4576. 
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the jackpot obligations through its own voluntary acts-
surrendering its license or filing for bankruptcy, for 
example-the liability remained fixed as long as those 
possibilities were remote: "The existence of an absolute 
liability is necessary; absolute certainty that it will be 
discharged by payment is not."46 U a legitimately deducted 
liability is not ultimately satisfied, proper tax accounting, 
the Court suggested, requires making a later adjustment 
under the tax benefit ruleY This conclusion, which also 
ignored the time value of money,48 elicited a strong 
dissent by Justice Stevens. Stevens argued that the 
Court's opinion implicitly rejected the valid distinction 
between (i) the nonpayment of an existing fixed (and 
therefore potentially deductible) obligation and (ii) the 
nonexistence of an obligation.49 The progressive jackpot 
guaranty, Stevens maintained, belonged in the latter 
category until a winning pun of the handle. 5° 
Each of these four issues had been important prior to 
the Tax Reform Act of 1984. Hughes Properties thus 
would have been instructive had there been no 1984 Act. 
The next question for consideration, however, is whether 
the Court's opinion is any help in analyzing similar cases 
that are governed by new section 461 (h) of the Code. 
Ill. The Tax Reform Act of 1984 and Hughes Properties 
A. Background 
The 1984 Act, by adding section 461 (h) to the Internal 
Revenue Code, significantly changed the rules governing 
the timing of deductions by accrual-basis taxpayers. The 
Congress was concerned that the all events test, as 
judicially constr~ed in some cases, permitted the deduc-
46/d. {quoting Helvering v. Russian Finance & Constr. Corp., 77 
F.2d 324, 327, 35-1 U.S. Tax Cas. {CCH) section 9367, at 9981 
{2d Cir. 1935)). If bankruptcy had been more than an extremely 
remote possibility for Hughes, the result in the case would 
presumably have been different. 
4754 U.S.L.W. at 4576 (citing Treas. Reg. section 1.461-1 (a){2}). 
48The tax benefit rule merely requires later inclusion of a dollar 
amount equal to the amount of the deduction previously taken. 
For example, if a one dollar deduction is taken in 1986 for a 1991 
liability, and the liability is not satisfied, the taxpayer must 
include the one dollar in income in 1991. Viewed from the 
perspective of 1986, the taxpayer thus received a one dollar de-
duction with an inclusion obligation having a present value of 
considerably less than one dollar. See infra note 51. 
49Justice Stevens, joined in dissent by Chief Justice Burger, 
cited World Airways, Inc. v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 786 (1974). 
aff'd, 564 F.2d 886, 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragraph 9149 
(9th Cir. 1977). in which an airline's statutory obligation to 
overhaul engines and airframes used for a certain number of 
hours was held to be contingent because certain events, such as 
bankruptcy or the crash or other disposition of an airplane, 
could prevent the obligation from ripening. 54 U.S.LW. at 4576 
(citing World Airways, 62 T.C. at 804). An airline subject to the 
statute would have an obligation to overhaul the aircraft only if 
the airline was going to proceed with business as usual. 
50Stevens suggested that a relevant consideration in deter-
mining whether a liability in fact exists is whether the claim is 
one that would be discharged in bankruptcy, and a jackpot 
guaranty clearly would not. 54 U.S.L.W. at 4576. The govern-
ment, however, had not advanced such a position: 
The point [in discussing bankruptcy] is not that [Hughes] 
has creditors whose claims might be discharged in bank-
ruptcy. The point is that no slot machine player could 
even assert a claim against [Hughes] in bankruptcy unless 
and until he had won a jackpot. 
Reply Memorandum for the United States at 3, Hughes Prop-
erties. (Emphasis in original.) 
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tion of amounts that exceeded the true cost of the 
liabilities. For example, consider a taxpayer which could 
demonstrate that it had a fixed, definite liability to pay 
$100 in five years for an otherwise deductible expense. 
With both the fact and the amount of the liability set, and 
if no other statutory or judicial barrier intervened, the 
taxpayer could deduct the full $100 currently, without 
any discounting to reflect the time value of money. 
Therefore, a liability with a present value of less than 
$100 could generate a currentdeduction equal to the full 
$1 00-a "premature accrual."51 
The taxpayer could deduct the full [amount] 
without any discounting to reflect the time 
value of money. 
The Internal Revenue Service has never been happy 
with premature accruals, but the reason for its concern 
was not clearly articulated in the older cases and rulings. 
The Commissioner did not speak in terms of the time 
value of money until recently.52 Although he provided no 
underlying theory for his position, the Commissioner 
generally fought any deduction taken prior to the time 
that services were performed or property was provided. 53 
In the above example, if the $100 liability is for services to 
be performed in five years, the Commissioner would have 
insisted, even without benefit of the modifications made 
by the 1984 Act, that the deduction also be delayed for 
five years. In the language of the all events test, the 
Commissioner would have .argued that the fact,of the 
liability is not fixed until the services are performed. If 
successful in such an argument, and if the $100 is in fact 
paid in five years, the Commissioner would have brought 
the cost of the liability ($1 00 in five years) and the deduc-
tion for the liability ($1 00 in five years) into alignment.54 
51The present value of that future obligation, using a discount 
rate of five percent compounded semiannually, is $78.12. That 
is, if the taxpayer invested $78.12 today at a five percent after-tax 
rate of return, it would have the $100 in five years necessary to 
satisfy the liability. 
52See Jensen, supra note 11, at 477. In one sense, it is unfair to 
the Commissioner to suggest that the time value of money was 
not an articulated concern; attacks on accelerated deductions of 
course have been motivated by the knowledge that, all other 
things being equal, a deduction today is worth more than a de-
duction next year. The point here, however, is that no full theory 
was developed by the Commissioner to justify his challenges to 
premature accruals. 
53The Service was not entirely consistent in this posture. See, 
e.g., Rev. Rul. 69-429, 1969-2 C.B. 108 (self-insured partnership 
obligated to pay injured employees in installments, with the 
payments fixed by the state Industrial Commission under 
worker's compensation statute, permitted to deduct full undis-
counted amount in year of award); see also Gunn, Matching of 
Costs and Revenues as a Goal of Tax Accounting, 4 Va. Tax Rev. 
1, 26 (1984) (discussing potentially absurd applications of Rev. 
Rul. 69-429); McGown, Structured Settlements: Deduct Now and 
Pay Later, 60 Taxes 251, 257 (1982) (discussing planning poten-
tial of Rev. Rul. 69-429). 
54 lf payment is not made in five years but the taxpayer is 
permitted a deduction at that time, a premature accrual will still 
result, although it would obviously be less beneficial than a de-
duction in thE? same amount taken five years earlier. 
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In challenging premature accruals prior to the 1984 
Act, the Internal Revenue Service thus in effect added a 
"performance" requirement to the all events test. An 
alternative attack was available under section 446(b) of 
the Code: a deduction much-earlier than performance 
should be denied because it would "not clearly reflect 
income."55 The Service, however, seldom made such an 
argument. 56 Instead, by formalistically concentrating on 
the all events test, the Service burdened the language of 
the regulation with more than it could carry. The regula-
tion made no reference to performance, or anything like 
that, and the Service's litigation record was accordingly 
less than perfectY Frustrated by the courts, the Service 
took its grievances to Congress. 
B. Economic Performance Requirement 
Congress, newly sophisticated in 1984 about the time 
value of money, was receptive to the Commissioner's 
pleas. To impose some rationality on the deduction 
scheme, Congress in the Tax Reform Act required that a 
deduction be taken no earlier than ''economic perform-
ance," thereby generally codifying the Commissioner's 
prior position. The all events test was retained-indeed, 
elevated from the regulations into the Code58-but the 
economic performance requirement was grafted on to 
that test.59 As a result, to be entitled to deduct a future 
liability in the current taxable year, a taxpayer must now60 
demonstrate not only the fact and the amount of the 
liability, but also that economic performance has occurred 
or is occurring. 
New section 461 (h) in general operates to 
defer deductions . ... 
Economic peformance in general occurs as activities 
are performed that are necessary to satisfy the liability. 
What constitutes economic performance depends on the 
nature of the subject transaction. Economic performance 
attributable to an obligation to provide or pay for prop-
erty or services occurs only as the property or services 
55See supra note 43. 
56Mooney Aircraft is an unusual example in which the Com-
missioner successfully argued the clear reflection standard with 
respect to a premature accrual. See supra note 43; Jensen, supra 
note 11, at 470-72 (discussing possible reason why Service 
generally did not press clear reflection argument). 
57See, e.g., Denise Coal v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 930, 935, 
59-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragraph 9769, at 74,035 (3d Cir. 
1959} (strip mining reclamation obligation under Pennsylvania 
law held currently deductible); Harrold v. Commissioner, 192 
F.2d 1002, 52-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragraph 9107, at 45,138 
(4th Cir. 1951) (strip mining reclamation obligation under West 
Virginia law held currently deductible); Ohio River Collieries Co. 
v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1369 (1981) (strip mining reclamation 
obligation under Ohio law held currently deductible). 
58Following the language of the regulations, I.R.C. section 
461 {h}(4) provides that "the all events test is met with respect to 
any item if all events have occurred which determine the tact of 
liability and the amount of such liability can be determined with 
reasonable accuracy." 
59See supra note 4. 
60See supra note 3 (effective date of section 461 (h)). 
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are provided. 61 For liabilities arising from tort or worker's 
compensation claims, economic performance occurs as 
required payments are made to another person.62 The 
statute also provides that economic performance with 
respect to a liability arising from the use of property (an 
obligation under a lease, for example) occurs as the 
property is used.63 In all other cases, the Secretary of the 
Treasury is directed to issue regulations governing the 
determination of economic performance. 54 
New section 461 (h) in general operates to defer deduc-
tions; that, of course, is why the provision was added to 
the Code. Economic performance will usually be later 
than, or will coincide with, the time at which the un-
modified all events test is met. In most cases, economic 
performance fixes the fact of a liability; prior to the Tax 
Reform Act, even the Commissioner conceded that re-
sult.65 The first part of the all events test is therefore 
generally redundant. In addition, the amount of a liability 
will usually be reasonably certain, if not fixed, at the time 
of economic performance. Hence, in most cases, the 
critical consideration will be the time of economic per-
formance; the requirements for deductibility will be met 
no earlier than, but also no later than, that time. 
C. Economic Performance and Hughes Properties 
The facts of Hughes Properties, if governed by section 
461 {h), would easily fit within the terms of the statute. A 
careful analyst can discover many conceptual difficulties 
with the application of the economic performance re-
quirement,66 but none of those difficulties would be 
involved in a progressive jackpot case. Economic per-
formance under the statute would be deemed to occur at 
the time that the machine's arm is pulled and the machine 
disgorges its promise of riches;67 the time that Hughes 
provides services or property.68 The fact of the liability 
and the amount of the liability would also then be set. 
61 1.R.C. sections 461 (h)(2)(A). 461 (h)(2)(B). 
a21.R.0. section 461 (h)(2)(C). 
63J.R.C. section 461 (h)(2)(A)(iii). 
64LR.C. section 461 (h)(2)(D). 
65See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text. Whether it 
should have satisfied a Commissioner attuned to the time value 
of money is another matter. If both economic performance and 
fulfillment of the all events test precede payment or other 
satisfaction of a liability, the benefit of a premature accrual still 
exists under the new law. In that situation, section 461 (h) may 
defer a deduction, but not long enough. See Jensen, supra note 
11, at 483-84. 
66For example, until the issuance of clarifying regulations, 
there may be difficulty in determining when economic perform-
ance has in fact occurred. When does economic performance 
occur in a two-party, nonsimultaneous barter transaction, when 
both parties to the transaction are providing property or services? 
Does economic performance occur as party A provides property 
or services or as party B provides property or services? And how 
should economic performance be deemed to occur when prop-
erty or services are provided over more than one year? See 
Bowers & Stone, Some Items Still Deductible Under All-Events 
Test Despite New Economic Performance Rules, 64 J. Tax'n 354, 
355 (1986). 
67Perhaps the arm could be pulled a fraction of a second 
before midnight on the last day of the taxable year, and the 
winning combination could appear in the next taxable year. 
Another theorist can determine in which year economic per-
formance is deemed to occur in such~a case. 
68 lt should not matter whether the casino is deemed to be 
providin:g services or whether it is deemed to be providing 
property. 
TAX NOTES, September 1, 1986 
Indeed, at that time, given the Nevada statutory and 
regulatory scheme,69 no uncertainty whatsoever would 
remain: the obligation would be unquestionably fixed, 
and the identity of the payee and the time of payment 
would be unquestionably known.7° 
Nothing in the Supreme Court's opinion is . .. 
helpful . .. in deciding casino cases under the 
1984 Act. 
For future progressive jackpot cases, unless a statutory 
exception to the economic performance requirement 
applies, section 461 (h) provides exactly the result that 
the government sought, and that the Court rejected, in 
Hughes Properties: deferring the casino's deduction until 
the jackpot is won. Only one exception to the economic 
performance requirement can even arguably apply to 
such jackpot obligations, and the application of that 
exception appears to have a fatal flaw, as described 
below. Accordingly, nothing in the Supreme Court's 
opinion is necessary, or even helpful, in deciding casino 
cases under the 1984 Act. The Court in Hughes Properties 
answered a number of questions that have disappeared 
from the consideration of similar fact situations.71 
D. A Brief Digression 
The conclusion that section 461 (h) easily resolves 
future progressive jackpot cases assumes that no excep-
tion to the economic performance requirement applies. 
For "certain recurring items,"72 however, the Code in 
effect relies on the unmodified all events test to determine 
the timing of deductions. Since this exception, if it did 
apply, would leave the authority of Hughes Properties 
unimpaired, a brief digression is necessary to explain 
why the exception appears not to be available.73 
The progressive jackpot obligations meet three of the 
four requirements for application of the exception: (1) As 
Hughes Properties decides, the unmodified all events test 
is met in a year prior to the year of economic per-
formance;74 (2) the obligations are recurring in nature 
and are consistently accounted for by the casinos;75 and 
{3) the accrual of a jackpot obligation in an earlier taxable 
year gives a better matching of income and expense than 
would accruing the liability in the year of economic 
69See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text. 
70The time of payment would be known unless the casino 
contests, and does not pay, the liability. In that case, no deduc-
tion would be permitted until the contingency disappears. See 
infra note 82 and accompanying text. 
71The issues have not disappeared, of course, from those 
casino cases in the litigation pipeline that are not governed by 
the Tax Reform Act. See supra note 5. 
721.R.C. section 461 (h)(3). 
73"Appears" is the appropriate word because, "in many if not 
most of the cases, it will be difficult to determine it the exception 
is available." Bowers & Stone, supra note 66, at 356. 
74 l.R.C. section 461 (h)(3)(A)(i). 
751.R.C. section 461 (h}(3)(A)(iii). 
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performance.'6 On the third point, too, tr1e opinion in 
Hughes Properties Is helpful: the Court gives surprisingly 
great weight to the matching principle and the determina-
tion of "true income" in concluding that a deduction prior 
to performance must be permi tted." 
The final requirement tor application of the recurring 
items exception is more p roblematic, however: economic 
performance must occur no later than 8% months aft er 
the c lose of the taxab.le yea r in which the all events test is 
met.76 No regulations have yet specified the workings of 
this (or an y other) requirement of the exception, but the 
requirement can apply to progressive jackpots only if it is 
very generously interpreted. 
The exception for recurring items was intended to 
"avoid d isrupting normal business and accountin9 p rac-
tices" when the benefit of a premature accrual for an item 
would be slight.n Progressive jackpots are, by their 
natu re, not routine; the precise timing for any particular 
machine cannot be predicted in advance. Moreover, the 
time value benefit of accruing future liabilities for some of 
the machines in any particular year may be substantial. 
On the average, Hughes· progressive jackpots were paid 
every 4'h months, c learly within the prescribed period. 
But not all jackpots were so paid. One machine had not 
been forthcoming wi th its prize for 35 months. no Nor can 
it be said that the payment ot any particular jackpot more 
than B'h. months after the end of a taxable year was aberra-
tional; it was statistically to be expected that some 
jackpots would be delayed to such an extent. 
In sum, whether the appropriate "item" for analysis 
under the recurring items exception is the aggregate of 
the jackpot obligations for all machines or the jackpot 
obligations with respect to any particular machine, the 
8% month test would not be met on a recurring basis .. The 
economic performance requirement should therefore re-
main applicable to progressive jackpots. 
761.R.C. section 461 (h)(3l(A)(iv). As an alternative to si'lowing 
that better matching would result from an e<U"Iier accrual, the 
taxpayer may demonstrate that the item is not a ''material item." 
For the evaluation of either alternative. the treatment of the item 
on financial accounting statements must be taken Into account 
I.R.C. section 461(h)(3)(B). 
" The Court stated that 
one of· the expenses that necessarily aMends the produc-
tion of income from a ·progressive slot machine is the 
commitment of a particular portion of the revenue gene.r-
at'ed to an Irrevocable jackpot. (Hughes's) true income 
from its progressive slot machines is only that portion of 
the money gamblod which it is entitled to keep. 
54 U.S.l.W. at 4576 (emphasis added). The government had 
strenuously argued, with a great deal of support in recent 
Supreme Court opinions (seo, e.g., Thor Power Tool Co. v. 
Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 542-43 (1979)), that matching is 
not a significant tax accounting concept even though it continues 
to be important for financial accounting purposes. See Brief for 
the United States at 26-28, Hughes Properties. The Court agreed 
that "financial accounting does not control for tax purposes" 
because the purposes of tl:lEr two accounting regimes are differ-
ent, 54 U.S.L.W. at 4575, but it nevertheless deferred to the 
matching principle. This resuscitation of an apparently dying 
concept in tax law came as a surprise to some commentators. 
See, e.g., Gunn, supra note 53: Jensen, supra note 11, at 472-76. 
" I.R.C. section 461 (h)(3)(A)(ii). If a "reasonable period" after 
the close of the taxable year is less than 8\7 months, that shorter 
period governs. 
" H.R. Coni. Rep. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 873 (1984). 
00Se&supra text accompanying note 17. 
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IV. Hughes Properties and Noncasirto Cases 
Section Ill' of this article concluded that, if the Tax 
Reform Act of 1984 had applied to th'e facts of Hughes 
Properties, the result would have been straightforward, 
and the Supreme Court's analysis would have played no 
role in reaching that result. Hughes P;operties quite 
simply has nothing to say about the fu ture resolution of 
·Similar cases. 
This is not to say, however, that the opinion necessari ly 
has no future effect. Although the all events test, as 
applied to l iabilities, has been stripped of much of its 
importance by the Tax Reform Act, it has not d isappeared 
altogether; the test for current deductibility under section . 
461 (h) is not solely economic performance. In those 
cases in which economic performance precedes the 
fulfillment of the o ld all events test, the all events test 
retai ns vital ity. 
The all events test ... has been stripped of 
much of Its Importance . ... 
For example, consider a l iability, for services already 
performed. that is contested by an accrual-basis taxpayer. 
Even though economic pef6rmance has occurred because 
of the performance of tt'le services, the liability is not 
cu rrently deductible because the all events test has not 
been met The contest itself defeats the fact of the 
l iabil ity , at.least in part,e: and the special Code provision 
dealing with contested liabilities wi ll help the taxpayer 
only if the contested l iabi lity is fi rst paid.82 
The significance of Hughes Properties thus depends 
on the scope of cases In which economic performance 
may occur befo re both the fact and the amount of a 
liabil ity have been set. If there are few such cases. 
Hughes Properties is indeed an insignificant decision. 
But this category of cases may not be small or inherently 
unimportant. Indeed, General Dynamics, although it too 
w ill be decided under pre-Act law, is an example of the 
. continuing significance of the all events test. 
V. General Dynamics 
A. Facts 
General Dynamics and its affi liated corporations (col-
lectively, GO) were requi red under col lective bargaining 
agreements to maintain health insurance coverage for 
GO employees. In 1972 GO, which had earlier funded a 
plan through private insurance carriers, took over the 
insurance function Itself. GD established reserves to 
meet its estimated liabi l ity and retained the two insurance 
firms that had earlier provided coverage to evaluate and 
approve benefit c laims. O n Its 1972 tax return GO de-
ducted· its liability for medical services assumed to have 
81 Jf only part of a liability is fixed in fact and the amount thereof 
can be dete~mined wi th reasonable accuracy, the regulations, as . 
yet not amended to reflect the 1984 Act, permit the deduction of 
the fi xed· part. Treas. Reg. section 1.461 -1 (a)(2). 
~I.A. C. section 461 (f) provides in ef1ect that the all events test 
may be deemed met. despite .a taxpayer's contest ol a liability, if 
a transfer or property or services is made to satisfy the liability. 
TAX NOTES, September 1, 1986 
I 
. .4 
; i 
'. \ 
'\, 
been performed during the year; that is, GD deducted not 
only its liability for those employees whose claims had 
been approved during the year, but also its estimated 
liability for claims during the year that had either not yet 
been filed, or, if filed, had not yet been approved. 
The Commissioner denied the deductions for the esti-
mates,83 even though the estimates were based on the 
actuarial principles used by the insurance industry for 
determining such "incurred but not reported" (IBNR) 
claims.84 The basis for the denial was the all events test. 
The Commissioner contended that no deduction should 
be permitted until an insurance company administrator 
had approved a claim for payment. At any earlier time, 
GO could establish no liability in fact: either an employee 
might not file a claim or, for one reason or another, the 
administrator might deny the claim.85 Accordingly, in the 
government's view, any deduction permitted would be 
with respect to "expenses that [GO] may never incur at 
all."sa 
GD prevailed at both the Claims Court87 and Federal 
Circuit88 levels. The last event necessary to fix liability 
was held to be the "occurrence of the insured event,"89 
that the provision of medical services. In taking a 
deduction, "[GD wasJ not predicting the happening of 
future events; rather, [it was] estimating the amount of 
fixed liability for events which had already occurred."90 
Not everything reflected in a reserve account would 
necessarily be paid to claimants, but absolute certainty is 
not required to establish the fact of a liability. The all 
events test must be applied in a~'reasonable and practical 
matter,"91 and, so applied, the courts held, the test was 
met. 
83With respect to those claims already approved but not yet 
paid, there was no dispute about deductibility under the all 
events test. The 1984 Act, had it applied to these claims, should 
have added no furtttler uncertainty. Economic performance would 
have occurred with the provision of the medical services, and the 
liability would therefore have been deductible no later than the 
year of claim approval. Since claim approval could occur in a 
taxable year earlier than the year of payment, see infra note 101, 
the government effectively conceded that a premature accrual 
could result from some approved claims. See supra note 65; 
infra note 102. 
84GD followed actuarial principles, but it did not claim it was 
an "insurance company" specially entitled for that reason to 
deduct additions to reserves. See I.R.C. section 807 (permitting 
deduction for additions to reserves by life insurance companies); 
I.R.C. section 832(b){5) {permitting deduction for additions to 
reserves by casualty insurance companies}. 
85The administrator was required to determine ~'whether the 
medical procedures were covered by the health plans, whether 
stipulated maximum charges had been exceeded, and whether 
the treatment was medically necessary." Supplemental Memo-
randum for the United States at 2, United States v. General 
Dynamics (No. 85-1385}. About 90 percent of the amounts for 
which GO's employees claimed reimbursement had historically 
been approved for payment. General Dynamics Corp. v. Un;ted 
States, 6 Cis. Ct. 250, 254, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragraph 
9783, at 85,322 (1984). 
66Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, General Dynamics. 
676 Cis. Ct. 250, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragraph 9783 
(1984). 
88773 F.2d 1224, 85-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragraph 9688 
{Fed. Cir. 1985). 
896 Cis. Ct. at 255, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH), at 85,323. 
90/d. ( 
91fd. 
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By validating GD's actuarial principles, the lower courts 
approved the use of probability theory to determine the 
fact of a liability. It is important to understand the narrow 
scope of the holding. The Claims Court and the Federal 
Circuit did not hold that probability theory could be used 
to generate a current deduction for medical services to 
be provided to employees in future years. Based on its 
experience, GO presumably could have estimated such 
future expenses with a fair degree of accuracy. But the 
permitted deduction for as-yet-unpaid expenses was 
limited to those arising from medical services already 
provided to employees. In seeking Supreme Court review, 
the government suggested that the Federal Circuit's 
opinion, if left standing, may permit taxpayers to deduct 
payments to self-insurance reserves generally.92 However, 
that argument grossly overstates the holding of the case. 
In no way does General Dynamics approve a deduction 
for additions to reserves to cover events that have not yet 
occurred,93 and the deductibility of such additions will, 
therefore, not be before the Supreme Court.94 
The lower courts approved the use of prob-
ability theory to determine the fact of a liability. 
The Court in General Dynamics will also not consider 
the application of probability theory to determine the 
amount, as opposed to the fact, of a liabitity. In the courts 
below, the government challenged the reasonable ac-
curacy of the estimated amounts, but it did not request 
Supreme Court review of that issue.95 The government's 
unwillingness to press this second point at this time96 is 
unfortunate because General Dynamics contains some 
interesting features. For example, a Court opinion could 
have provided guidance about the extent to which the 
Commissioner may use hindsight (that is, the actual 
amounts necessary to ultimately satisfy a liability) to 
92See Reply Memorandum the United States at 4-5, General 
Dynamics. The government cites an article in Forbes to show 
that the business community viewed the Federal Circuit decision 
as having far-reaching consequences. According to the article, 
the decision was a "light on the horizon" that would permit 
deductions for "[p]ayments made to self-insurance reserves" 
and thus properly blur the distinction for tax purposes between 
insurance companies and noninsurance companies. Saunders, 
Light on the Horizon, Forbes, Mar. 24, 1986, at 120. 
930verstatement and misstatement on this subJect by popular 
business periodicals appear to be common. See supra note 92; 
Seligman, Playing the Slots on an Accrual Basis, Fortune, July 7, 
1986, at 100 (favorably discussing Court decision in Hughes 
Properties, but misstating holding in Mooney Aircraft, see supra 
note 43, and ignoring effect of Tax Reform Act of 1984}. 
94 lf that issue were before the Court, there would be no doubt 
about the result. Brown v. Helvering should control, see supra 
note 23, and no current deduction should be permitted. 
95Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13 n.2, General Dynamics. 
96The government did not agree that the lower courts had 
ruled properly on the amount of liability issue, see id., and it is an 
issue that surely will be seen again. 
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